



# Pilgrimage 2018 After Action Report

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fourth annual Pilgrimage Music and Cultural Festival was scheduled for the Park at Harlinsdale Farm, located at 239 Franklin Rd, on September 22 and 23. The attendance cap was set at 27,500 each day, not counting children under 10. Another estimated 1500 personnel would manage the event. The music festival opened its gates at 10:00 am. With few exceptions, everything was progressing well until an approaching weather system required a suspension and evacuation of the festival at 4:24 pm and a cancellation of the day's event at 6:51 pm. Due to a variety of reasons outlined later in this report, Day 2 of the event was cancelled at the conclusion of an 8:15 Sunday morning briefing.

This report was developed to evaluate the overall event and has significant material related to the evacuation phase. It should be apparent that in areas where extensive planning and preparation were undertaken and shared, a favorable result occurred. Where there was a lack of planning, or where the plan was not widely known or properly executed, difficulties were encountered.

It is also important to note that while this after-action report is based on the Pilgrimage Festival, it should help guide how the City, its partners, and event coordinators look at and plan for other events occurring in the City of Franklin.

## METHODOLOGY


On September 26<sup>th</sup>, four days after the event, a request for information was distributed to all agencies and departments who had some role in the event. The request sought general observations from each participant, whether real or perceived, that they or their counterparts experienced. These notes were compiled and formed the basis for an agenda for a debriefing session that was held on October 5<sup>th</sup>. The meeting had representation from all Public Safety agencies, affected City departments, and Pilgrimage. Information gleaned from these sources, as well as, public safety audio recordings, recorded video footage from eighteen cameras in the festival venue, incident logs, and other sources were used to the extent possible to validate the information contained herein.

## PRE-EVENT PREPARATIONS

Planning for the Pilgrimage Festival occurs year-round. This begins with the Event Permit application. Next, applicants appear before the special events committee comprised of a representative from every City Department, and in some instances, includes other stakeholders. The Special Events Committee works with the applicant and makes recommendations or conditions for approval. The Pilgrimage Festival, having greater than 200 attendees, are presented to Franklin's Board of Mayor and Aldermen at a work session meeting for discussion. The event will then go before the Board for approval, denial, or approval with changes. Once approved, various meetings covering all aspects of the event are scheduled. Numerous emails are exchanged as planning efforts continue. A detailed map set, as shown below, is provided to each agency that illustrates the planned festival layout. This information is overlaid within our ESRI ArcGIS platform to further our planning efforts. Finally, a Franklin Emergency Operations Plan is created for Pilgrimage that is specific to the event and is shared with those tasked with managing the event and some of our mutual aid providers. Pilgrimage creates a similar document that is distributed to their personnel with a copy provided and distributed to the leads of each department/agency. The Police Department also creates an Operations Plan unique to their needs which

is shared as appropriate. As Pilgrimage begins to construct the festival at Harlinsdale, multiple site visits occur from various agency participants.

On May 2<sup>nd</sup>, a table-top exercise was conducted at the Williamson County Public Safety Center involving 14 Pilgrimage staff members and 27 City of Franklin and/or partner agency representatives.



## UNIFIED COMMAND

This year's festival was operated with a Unified Command structure. While this was mostly effective, there was limited law enforcement presence in the room, except for Day 2's morning discussion. The Law Enforcement Commander had initially intended to be present in the Command Post but was working other aspects of the event due to other perceived operational needs. Despite this, communications between law enforcement leads and the Command Post occurred continually as needed throughout the event. There were a few occasions during the evacuation where it became difficult to reach one another. This also complicated the Command Post's ability to fully understand the roadway network throughout the evacuation and subsequent closure.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *While on-site staffing of law enforcement was increased for this year's event, there is a need to evaluate staffing further to assure that there are sufficient law enforcement personnel to function in all roles.*

## COMMAND POST

The formal command post provided sufficient space for the normal day-to-day operations and all needed equipment. It got a little crowded and noisy as leadership assembled to discuss the weather. The lack of sufficient WIFI coverage affected our ability to maintain consistent real time video surveillance. One of our employees who is a subscriber of FirstNet was able to stream full motion video without issue.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *The lack of sufficient WIFI support needs to be addressed for future events. The City should fully explore the benefits FirstNet - a high-speed, nationwide wireless broadband network dedicated to public safety and determine if we should invest in it for future events and day-to-day emergency operations.*

## INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Two new additions this year were enacted in the form of Incident Management and Video Surveillance. “Unified Command,” a company contracted by Pilgrimage, deployed 18 full motion high definition cameras throughout the venue. In addition, they provided an incident management software that was utilized to document various aspects of event management. These two resources provided invaluable real-time situational awareness and documentation for those managing the event. The lack of video surveillance along Franklin Rd and Liberty Pike prevented the Command Post from having this much-needed situational awareness which would have enabled them to make better operational decisions during the evacuation phase.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Additional cameras along Franklin Road and Liberty Pike should be incorporated.*

## PARKS DEPARTMENT

This year, Pilgrimage was granted permission to downsize the trailer allocated to City staff because of the addition of a Command Trailer and the expectation that Pilgrimage security would not be a joint tenant. This proved to be a challenge as the replacement was considerably smaller and didn’t provide the necessary room for housing of equipment needs and volume of personnel using it.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *A trailer of sufficient size for the intended purpose will be required for subsequent events.*

## IMPACTS TO FUTURE PARKS EVENTS

Harlinsdale is home to a variety of special events throughout the year. The weather incident this year created not only the need for an extended load-out time by Pilgrimage, but also a significant amount of time to repair the site for future use. This resulted in the City having to cancel some other planned events for the site and created a hardship for those applicants.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *City staff will work diligently to address how to handle these impacts for all future events. This may include Insertion of a buy-out clause in the existing contract or encouraging all Special*

Event Permit Holders who immediately follow Pilgrimage to purchase Event Cancellation insurance.

## TRAFFIC

A new traffic plan was initiated this year. Saturday's traffic from the start of the street setup until the festival suspension was significantly improved over the previous year with virtually no backup onto Franklin Rd, Mack Hatcher, or Cool Springs Blvd. Following are some observations:

### Prior to evacuation

- While there was virtually no traffic backup this year, it is not known how many vehicles utilized Franklin Rd as compared to the same timing as the previous year.
- The original cones placed along Franklin Rd to the north of Harpeth Industrial were placed as instructed. However, it was necessary to alter those closest to Franklin Rd to provide a more visual reference to the two-lane delineation. This was accomplished very early into the morning commute resulting in very few issues.
- Allowing traffic to self-manage into right and left lanes via message boards was not a perfect solution but was easily managed. The message board was initially incorrectly placed, and the language was incorrect, both of which were corrected early on. In addition, there were several LED's that were not functioning which made the message harder to read. While several vehicles used the right lane (north entrance) incorrectly, an officer and a Stewart Parking attendant were able to easily direct them through. Very few vehicles moved into the left lane (south entrance and through traffic) who should have been in the right lane. These vehicles proceeded straight without incident. Corrugated boards made by Pilgrimage that explained the lane changes were put out an hour early, which also caused traffic problems. Cars were heading into each other on one occasion before this was corrected. Because both traffic commanders had to fix the flow of traffic (cones, tapers, message boards), they were unable to attend the morning briefing. Because of the confusion, one minor accident occurred on Franklin Rd before corrections could be made. Two Streets department workers assisted Law Enforcement with correcting the issues which was greatly appreciated.
- While messaging and parking pass hang tags directed attendees to the north and south lots, an oversight on the part of Pilgrimage to place signs at the gates to indicate them as such ("North Lot" and "South Lot") occurred. Many drivers had to be directed to pull into the appropriate entrance instead of being able to self-manage. Make-shift signs indicating "North Lot" and "South Lot" were put into place which remedied the situation. Additional ingress delays into the south lot were created by parking attendants who were taking money at the South gate for ADA parking.
- Signs were created for this event that were to be placed at each driveway and road with direct access to Franklin Rd on the north side of the park that indicated the flow of traffic for each traffic pattern change. No responsibility was assigned to this task until 3:24 pm on Day 1. Despite this oversight, homeowners appeared to follow the appropriate traffic flow. This was attributed to articulating the traffic plan in the good neighbor letter provided to them in advance of the event.

- Traffic on Franklin Rd south of Harpeth Industrial Ct flowed well with no known deficiencies. We received one complaint from a resident on Myles Manor that he could not leave his street during the event. This has not been verified.
- City staff was told by Pilgrimage organizers that the Farmers Market, held weekly at the Factory, would be suspending their market during the event. We were told in the week leading up to the event that the Market would occur as scheduled. This presented some problems that were not insurmountable but that does increase the chances for accidents.

#### During evacuation

Until the evacuation was ordered, law enforcement traffic personnel maintained their assigned post. Upon the order to evacuate, Police had to reposition certain officers to fill new post assignments. During evacuation, all traffic was stopped on Franklin Rd, and most traffic on Liberty Pike between Eddy Lane and Franklin Rd. This was done to allow the volume of evacuating pedestrians access to sufficient space to safely seek shelter.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *The practice of placing directional signage at each driveway along Franklin Road will be reevaluated to determine its need.*
- *Because evacuations are unpredictable, Law enforcement should ensure sufficient personnel are available to work all posts as needed, including the management of an evacuation, without having to wait for officers to move from one assignment to the next.*

## STREET PREPARATIONS

Each year, the Streets Department, in conjunction with traffic control from Law Enforcement, prepares the roadway with a goal to provide safety and efficiency to those involved with Pilgrimage and the public. There were many meetings regarding the traffic plan that outlined needed equipment and design. While the plan was mostly executed, a few changes were made almost immediately after setup began. Some Law Enforcement officers reported that the changes were necessitated from lessons learned in previous years.

A well-designed traffic plan should be finalized at least two weeks prior to the event. Aside from the obvious reasons, this will allow time for messaging the traffic plan using a variety of resources. While this is the preferred method, situations that arise will often necessitate a change in the plan for public safety, and staff should be prepared to address them. As an example, five days prior to the event, Franklin First United Methodist Church, located at Franklin Rd and Mack Hatcher, informed the City that it would be selling parking. This had the potential of 1000+ pedestrians using the narrow shoulder of Franklin Rd to traverse to the north entrance to Harlinsdale. Pilgrimage placed additional lighting for the road in this area and the Fire Department placed a light tower on the pedestrian walkway leading to Harlinsdale Ct. The plan was for Law Enforcement to place rhino barriers along the street white line but this was abandoned during setup because of the narrowness of the shoulder would not also safely permit vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Cones were also attempted on Saturday morning but were removed for the same reasons. When first meeting with the church representative, it was agreed that we would be closing Daniel McMahan Lane. The day before the event, a separate church representative informed us that the closing of Daniel McMahan would pose issues to their congregants as they had not had ample time to make advanced notifications. The City agreed to open Daniel McMahan on Sunday



until just after the last service was to begin. Since the event was cancelled on Sunday, this was not necessary. Closing of Daniel McMahon during the event is necessary for public safety and will be conveyed to the church sooner in future years. Approximately 240 cars, or 550 people, used this parking lot. This number may have been higher if the event had not closed early on Saturday.

Last year, Street Department crews experienced significant delays during teardown while waiting for someone from Pilgrimage to assist in the operation of equipment. The Department provided their own equipment this year which greatly improved this process.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *It is important that any recommended changes to the traffic plan or set-up are shared during planning meetings to avoid duplication of effort.*
- *While last minute changes to the traffic plan are sometimes unavoidable, an effective communications method should be established between all affected parties to ensure we are prepared to execute the plan.*
- *Daniel McMahon should be closed for future Pilgrimage events. An exception could be made if this becomes a designated off-site parking location.*
- *Sufficient lighting for the area of Franklin Rd north of Harlinsdale should be included each year.*

## PEDICABS

Pedicabs are operated between downtown and Harlinsdale Farm to provide attendees an opportunity to ride instead of walking. Due to the limited road network, having a lane of traffic with a pedestrian lane continues to prove difficult to manage with the integration of pedicabs. It is presently designed that pedicabs will use the traffic lane when traveling toward town and the pedestrian lane when traveling toward the festival. Pedicab operators continually weave in and out of traffic and pedestrians not being concerned with the traffic flow.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *It is recommended that pedicabs not be allowed to operate until a safer solution can be established.*

## DRONE

The Pilgrimage media staff followed all rules regarding on-site drone operations without issue. Last year, several attendee vehicles did not use the designated parking areas. Instead, parking occurred on streets like Old Liberty Pike, Daniels Dr, Eddy Ct, Reynolds Dr and other nearby streets. Vehicles were parked on private property as well as on public rights-of-way. Some signs were erected by the City to deter this but to little avail. Except for private property, public roadways appeared to remain passable by emergency vehicles; however, the placement of cars would have had significant impacts on fire apparatus being able to operate effectively should an incident have occurred. This year, additional signs were added that prohibited parking on side streets.

At 1230 pm, Pilgrimage operated their drone over these areas to capture the status of parking. While these streets were free of on street parking (except for the occasional homeowner) there were only 8535 attendees scanned into the venue. Using an average of 2.3 attendees per vehicle, approximately 3,710 vehicles would have already parked. With sufficient parking still available at all designated parking

locations, the likelihood that attendees would resort to parking in these areas had not yet been realized or assessed. A second drone launch was scheduled for 5 pm but was cancelled because of the weather and event postponement. With 22,103 attendees scanned, this would have provided greater intelligence as to the effects of our sign campaign and whether enforcement would have been needed.

*After Action Recommendations*

- *It is recommended that the City continue to post signs to deter parking along the road to ensure adequate access for public safety vehicles when needed.*

## PARKING

### OFF-SITE PARKING

Below is the population of attendees on site by hour beginning at 10 am. The vehicle estimate assumes 2.3 persons per vehicle for the total population and is not indicative of on-site parking only.

Time	Population	Estimated Vehicles
10:00	1335	573
11:00	4004	1718
12:00	7151	3069
13:00	10985	4715
14:00	15117	6488
15:00	18847	8089
16:00	21547	9248
16:30	22103	9486

### ON-SITE PARKING

There is always considerable discussion by City staff to limit or exclude parking on the grounds of Harlinsdale. This has advantages and disadvantages. Some of these are outlined below:

Some Advantages:

- When cars park on site, attendees are in close proximity to shelter in their vehicles.
- When wet weather does not occur, this provides convenience to attendees including those who are physically impaired.
- The safety benefits of reducing traffic and pedestrians using the same road network will be recognized.

Some Disadvantages:

- Pilgrimage must have vehicle access to the site. The majority of that traffic uses the North entrance although some must use the South entrance. The only aspect that can be eliminated is attendee parking. The north lot is presently allotted 1,500 vehicle parking spaces but may be able to park additional vehicles. There is presently not sufficient parking for all the north lot cars at the designated off-site parking lots. Additional parking can be secured but will increase the time and distance for people to walk.

- Harlinsdale’s South Lot is allotted 2,000 vehicle parking spaces. There is presently not sufficient parking for this number of cars at the designated off-site parking lots. Additional parking can be secured but will increase the time and distance for people to walk.
- During an evacuation, an estimated 2.3 people, for every vehicle that is eliminated from the site, must traverse to a parking lot located farther than the current ones.
- A significant increase will occur in the time and distance needed for attendee to reach a shelter thus requiring the decision to evacuate to be made sooner.
- A likely increase in the impact to surrounding traffic during an evacuation will occur.
- There are 138 address points that utilize Franklin Rd between the Park’s south entrance and First Avenue, 53 address points that utilize Franklin Rd between the Park’s south entrance and Mack Hatcher, and 425 address points that utilize Liberty Pike between Franklin Rd and Eddy Lane. The impact to these residents and/or those who wish to visit them, deliveries, and services should be taken into account. At a minimum, traffic from these areas will have to be permitted.
- It may prove more difficult to access the site by outside emergency vehicles when a clearly defined traffic pattern is not already established.

It is worth noting that while eliminating on-site parking in the south or north lot would prevent the ground damage that occurred in those areas, it would have no effect in preventing the remaining damage experienced within the park should a similar rain event occur. The image captures the damaged areas.

In addition, the Franklin Road construction project’s impact to the festival will not be recognized for a few months. This will require extensive planning and coordination.



*After Action Recommendations*

- *City staff will continue to work with Pilgrimage to fully evaluate on-site parking to determine the best course of action moving forward.*

EVACUATION/CANCELLATION

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2018

At 1539 hours, WeatherOps radar, which was being utilized in the Command Post, indicated lightning within 20 miles of the venue. In accordance with the Pilgrimage weather ops plan, a Code Yellow was issued. A Code Yellow is a Pilgrimage internal alert or warning that potentially bad weather could be moving toward the Festival. The Emergency Manager (EM) immediately notified City Parks, Risk and Street staff working the event to report to their designated posts for possible evacuation which included opening City Hall and the Old Courthouse basement. The EM then ordered the dispatch of a fire resource to Liberty Elementary to open the facility and to direct any attendees to shelter therein as

needed. Finally, the EM notified Law Enforcement to begin preparing to enact the evacuation plan that was reviewed earlier in the day. The Fire Incident Commander recommended that medical resources be positioned along the pedestrian evacuation routes which would make medical availability more accessible and timely. This was approved and the EMS Incident Commander summoned two additional EMS units to stage in the area. Three medical calls were answered along these routes with two of them involving transport to a hospital, one of which was a law enforcement officer who was struck by a vehicle.

Prior to closing the festival, the EM received an update from the Pilgrimage Ops Manager about his conversations with a meteorologist from WeatherOps. The EM had also spoken to a meteorologist from the Nashville office of the National Weather Service. These calls were made to validate what we were witnessing on radar which showed rain and lightning that was trending toward the event site, with the closest lightning strike occurring 14 miles away.

Both meteorologist shared very similar information that a weather event containing torrential rains and heavy lightning was moving directly toward the festival. In addition, the event would be sustained for some time. While winds were expected to contain gusts of 10 to 20 miles per hour it was not deemed a significant factor. The timing to impact the site was estimated to be between 4:30 and 5:00 pm.

At the time, Pilgrimage indicated that 21,547 attendees had been scanned. At 4:24pm, the EM gave the order to evacuate the site in the interest of public safety. This action was immediately undertaken by Pilgrimage staff by issuing a Code Red. The EM immediately notified City staff that evacuation had been ordered. The EM decision to evacuate the site was based in part on the following:

- Persons are not safe outdoors during lightning
- Tents are not safe shelter locations during lightning
- Designated off-site parking locations are between 1 and 1½ miles walking distance from the venue entrance
- It takes several minutes to shut down traffic on the roadways to allow for 15,000+ people to walk down the streets safely.
- While sheltering in on-site cars would have provided safety for some 10,000 attendees, one could not expect that all would shelter there.
- 15 minutes is considered a fast pace walk. It is not reasonable to expect attendees to retrieve their belongings and/or children, navigate through the venue, and navigate to their cars in this timeframe. A more conservative estimate is 30 minutes at best for those who act immediately and deliberately.
- While it was evident in the distance that a storm was approaching, many attendees failed to take deliberate evacuation steps since there was no immediate threat upon them.
- Rain, which was predicted to arrive prior to full evacuation being accomplished would further slow the speed at which attendees could travel.
- Weather is unpredictable and despite forecasters best efforts, they are not always accurate.

For reasons previously stated, vehicles were held in Harlinsdale Park until attendees evacuating on foot were cleared from the streets as this was part of our shelter in place evacuation plan. Once pedestrians were safe and roads were clear we allowed cars to leave the site.

At 4:35 pm, radar indicated lightning was 8 miles from the site. At 4:50 pm, rain was occurring on the site. As the storm continued its advancement, radar captured 69 recorded lightning strikes within 8 miles of the site from approximately 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm, with one strike as close as .9 miles away.

Once it was deemed safe to do so, Pilgrimage allowed their designated team to assess the site for its ability to reopen the venue. They met in the Command Post and briefed the EM on their findings. Their discussions expanded to talk about the possibility of resuming the event. The EM detailed for them the logistical problems that would prevent them from being able to resume based on weather information of another storm system that was estimated to impact the site two hours later. Some of those logistical problems included:

- Time needed to correct some site issues to ensure attendees and staff were safe
- Time needed to message the attendees
- Time needed for attendees to return to the site or the off-site parking areas, park their vehicles, and walk to the site
- Time needed for attendees to go through scanners and bag checks to reenter the festival area
- Time needed for a show, specifically a headliner to perform
- And the time for attendees to safely navigate back to their cars before the next storm event occurred

As the organizers considered each of these items, it was realized that these things could not be accomplished in the window of opportunity. At 6:51, Pilgrimage agreed that the festival would be closed and began messaging that information.

At 7:23 pm, a Code Yellow was issued on the site because of the approaching weather. At 9:02 pm, the Code Yellow was terminated once lightning had not been detected within a 20-mile radius of the event.

## PILGRIMAGE DAY 2

Prior to leaving the site on Day 1, the Emergency Manager identified a four-step process with Pilgrimage for how a determination would be reached for the event to continue as planned.

1. Conduct a daylight site survey with City Parks and Risk Management officials to determine the viability of the Park grounds to sustain continued safe attendance.
2. Conduct a daylight site survey to determine the impact to Pilgrimage infrastructure and off-site parking lots, to determine their viability to sustain continued safe operations.
3. An assessment of Pilgrimage's ability to more effectively evacuate the site should another triggering weather event occur.
4. An assessment of the City's ability to support a safe event.

On Sunday, a site survey began with planning at 0600, followed by assembling of teams and a canvas of the various areas. After this process, Pilgrimage Staff including the three producers met with City staff leaders in the Command Post. City Administrator Eric Stuckey participated in the conversation by speaker phone. The Emergency Manager facilitated the meeting and asked a series of questions which were answered below.

1. What was the general impression of the site to support Day 2 operations? Answer – Tents and structures were ok. The sun shade tents were of concern due to water and would likely

need to be coned off. CAT power would need to check all electrical connections to the stages to ensure they were show ready. This would require some time to accomplish. The park ground had sustained significant damage in several key areas. The back of house area for the Gold Record Stage had suffered to the point that it could not support production efforts which would require transporting band gear and other necessities from vehicles elsewhere on the site or from the Factory. Either way, this would prove to be problematic for some of the pedestrian traffic. The Parks Director advised that the park grounds themselves could be utilized for the event but would require staff to distribute straw to multiple locations to cover mud throughout the pedestrian areas. The south parking lot would have to be closed, as well as part of the north parking lot.

2. How many day 2 tickets sales had occurred? Answer – approximately 25,000
3. How many designated on-and off-site parking spaces would not be usable on day 2? Answer – Numbers are estimated.
  - a. South lot 2000
  - b. North lot 750
  - c. Liberty Elementary 800
  - d. Ligon Property 400
  - e. Bicentennial Park 250

An estimated 4,200 parking spaces were not usable.

Considering this information, the following was known or surmised:

1. Figuring an average of 2.3 people per vehicle, an estimated 9,660 additional attendees, compared to day 1, would be parked off-site and at undesignated locations elsewhere in the city. This was calculated for the loss of parking spaces.
2. The potential for an additional 3,453 attendees and approximately 1500 vehicles, as compared to day 1, would have to utilize off-site and undesignated parking locations elsewhere in the city. This was calculated for the attendance difference between actual of day 1 and ticket sales for day 2.
3. While straw could be added to the muddy areas, much more additional work would have been required to smooth the ruts to prevent less trip hazards for those on the property.
4. All designated off-site parking lots, which are the closest to the event site, are an estimated 1 to 1½ walking miles from the site. Walking a 15-minute mile is considered a fast-paced walk. This is not a reality for the crowd size, the terrain, people with children, people carrying chairs and other items, physically impaired persons, persons under the influence of alcohol, and many other constraints.

In addition, rain was still occurring on the site and was forecasted to continue with the possibility of storms containing lightning, which would further impact the ability to prepare the site for opening.

The ultimate decision to cancel the event on day 2 took the above information into account while concluding the following:

- There was no alternative traffic plan in place to manage the undesignated parking that would occur off-site.



- Even if designated off-site parking locations could have been defined, it would be unlikely that Pilgrimage and the lot owner could have entered into a contract for that purpose.
- There was no staffing plan that could be developed that would ensure sufficient law enforcement could be present to manage a new traffic plan even if one could be defined.
- There was no foreseeable way to provide for the safety of pedestrians while traveling between the site and the additional parking areas.
- Any further evacuations, should the predicted severe weather affect the site, would have required much greater travel distances for attendees to reach safety and greater advanced notice to afford them time to safely evacuate.

*After Action Recommendations*

*Event postponements/cancellations are expected to be done by the festival organizers as prudent to do so. Emergency Command staff will always exercise final authority in the interest of Public Safety. As deemed appropriate, Command staff will consult with the City’s Risk Management and Law Departments.*

**SECURITY**

Pilgrimage contracts with different security company providers to hire over 200 security personnel to staff the event. Additionally, Pilgrimage added 20 walk-through metal detectors at the festival entrances. During the evacuation phase, it was expected that Pilgrimage Security would perform a sweep of the property directing all attendees that they must seek shelter in their vehicle or at a designated shelter. However, this was only minimally performed. In addition, several sources reported that some security personnel were providing incorrect information, and at the beer tent, forcibly attempting to remove attendees.



Following are some images and information regarding evacuation progress at different areas of the venue. Sound is not captured with the video; therefore, evacuation announcement times are estimated based on perceived crowd reactions.

At approximately 1635, Security personnel can be seen sweeping the Midnight Sun Stage area however their advancement stalls at the fire lane. The camera was then moved to a new view. There were not a lot of people in this area when the evacuation order was given, yet the crowd did not seem to respond to the evacuation announcement.



On the video, attendees in the Little Pilgrims Stage area didn't appear to react to the evacuation message. The area mainly cleared at 1643.

On the video, the VIP Village was virtually empty just prior to the evacuation notice being given. At 1436 there were several people in the tent and it is at this time that a security guard is seen providing directions. The tent begins to empty immediately and is mostly clear by 1639.





On the video, the evacuation notice was given at the Gold Record Stage very soon after it was ordered. The video shows that a substantial number of attendees in this arena emptied by 1636. By 1641, there were still several people in this area.








On the video, the evacuation notice for the Little Harpeth stage arena was given at 1627. The video shows that people reacted immediately in this area and it was mostly emptied by 1635.




At approximately 1645, a report was received by Command that the main beer tent was fully occupied.

At 1652, someone is seen elevated above the crowd and makes an announcement while the crowd turns to listen. There was no indication anyone reacted differently to it. At 1700, a Franklin Police Officer made an announcement using a bullhorn that the crowd could remain in the tent but should move away from the metal poles. This was met with favorable reactions from the crowd and some people began to move as directed while others seemed to pay no attention.

4:46 pm





At 1718, the crowd reaction seems to indicate an evacuation of the tent would occur as people began to don their rain outfits and gathered their belongings. However, very few are seen moving toward the tent exits. At 1723, people begin to leave the tent. At 1726, a Pilgrimage Security Officer is seen scuffling with an attendee. Law Enforcement arrives at 1727. The remainder of the crowd is then dispersed except for those assisting the police.


For those who are shielded from the rain, it is reasonable to expect that some people will not want to evacuate since there is no immediate weather threat perceived. Once rain begins to occur, additional resistance to leave will be evident.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *It is necessary that Pilgrimage Security Officers perform a site sweep early to avoid or lessen this occurrence.*

## EMERGENCY GATES

While emergency gates have been incorporated every year, a new type was utilized this year. These gates were more readily visible, provided clear instructions for anyone to operate without the use of any tools or locks, and facilitated the movement of pedestrians as intended.



## INCLEMENT WEATHER PLAN

Pilgrimage works with Weather Decision Technologies (WDT) to provide a professional meteorologist to monitor and report on weather conditions. The Emergency Response plan for Pilgrimage details certain conditions such as “Code Green” for all clear, “Code Yellow” for an alert or warning of potential bad weather, and “Code Red” for a delay/suspension of the show. While the criteria used for these various colors is not uncommon, there is little room for interpretation in which to make informed decisions. For instance, the speed at which a storm is approaching is not listed as a factor.



*After Action Recommendations*

- *The plan must be altered to allow for varying weather factors, that while being too numerous to list, will provide the flexibility needed to make better decisions of the code usage.*

## SAFETY ALERT MESSAGES

This year, Pilgrimage was required by the City to provide safety messages to be displayed on the stage monitors between music sets. Significant time was invested by Pilgrimage to create an on-site 4½-minute video-taped safety message. This message covered the following items:

- Emergency Exit Gate Locations
- Designated Fire Lane
- Low Back Chairs
- Hydration
- Misting Tents and Shade Structures
- Info Booth
- Lost and Found
- Meeting Spot
- Medical Tents
- Sunscreen Usage
- Stage monitors for emergency messages
- Exiting at closing
- Inclement Weather
- Emergency Shelters
- See Something, Say Something

These messages were delivered to the stage managers with instructions for its use throughout the day. In de-brief meetings with Pilgrimage following the event, we were informed that the video screen at one stage had been rotated upon installation and would not play the video correctly due to its format. A corrected version was created; however, the video was never aired at either stage.

*After Action Recommendations*

- *Pilgrimage must be required to demonstrate successful airing of this video from all stage screens prior to opening for business and must continue to successfully do so during the course of the event or until directed by Command Staff.*

## SITE EVACUATION CITY PLAN

Due to the potential for inclement weather, the City's Emergency Manager developed an evacuation strategy. This was sent to the City event leadership for review. The morning of the event, City staff leadership met to go over the plan to ensure that we could execute it if necessary with no cause for concern noted. The plan included shutting down all traffic on Franklin Rd to allow for pedestrian access to the road network to safely accommodate the volume of evacuees. Liberty Pike was closed from Franklin Rd to Eddy Lane for the same purpose. Additional measures including repositioning Law Enforcement Officers to strategic intersections along Liberty Pike and in Downtown to control traffic and direct evacuees.

For attendees who parked on or in proximity to the site, it is desired that attendees first seek shelter in their personal automobiles. Liberty Elementary and the Factory are intended for and sufficient to accommodate those who arrived by walking, biking, rideshare, canoe or some other means. Should the

event reopen, attendees could easily migrate back to the venue. Should the event transition from being suspended to being cancelled, attendees can simply leave the venue in their automobiles with rideshares being permitted access to the Factory.

Because many evacuees chose to shelter in the Factory instead of their cars, closing of the event necessitated that streets remained closed for an extended time as evacuees continued to their automobiles or traveled back to the venue to retrieve belongings or automobiles after the event cancellation.

#### Factory at Franklin

The contact for the Factory was notified of the impending evacuation prior to it being effective; however, he was not at the site. Although this notification was made to the staff of the Factory, they were unprepared for the event. As it is the closest shelter in relation to the event, thousands sought shelter there even though they were given direction to shelter in their vehicles. The influx of attendees quickly overwhelmed the location. While the Factory has the capacity to hold thousands of people, no direction was provided to attendees to move throughout the building. This caused others who were not able to get in to seek shelter in the nearby Mapco and under its gas pump canopy. It was reported that theft was occurring at the business and it was ordered to be shut down by Law Enforcement for the safety of those working there. While law enforcement was requested inside the Factory, there wasn't sufficient staff to do so and manage all other challenges.

#### City Hall and Basement of the Old Courthouse

These two shelters are not publicly announced but staff was positioned at 2<sup>nd</sup> and East Main to direct anyone needing shelter into these two sites. Nine City employees were assigned to these two sites and approximately 10 people utilized them. While it may be perceived that staff could have been better utilized, should attendees have chosen to seek shelter here we were prepared to provide direction to the attendees and look out for the interest of the buildings and their contents. It is not the City's responsibility to staff non-city shelters.

City Hall was pre-surveyed to ensure that the hallways, Training Room, Community Development Conference room and the Board room were ready for evacuees. City staff maintained possession of the keys to the old courthouse and verified their working condition and that the space would be ready for evacuees prior to the event.

#### Liberty Elementary School

The City Emergency Manager ordered the dispatch of a fire resource to Liberty Elementary to open the facility to all attendees seeking shelter. According to the school's representative, the vision of how the facility would be used as a shelter was exactly as planned. The City's Emergency Manager notified the representative that we were using the Fire Department Knox box to access the school for possible shelter from the storm. Most attendees who entered the school did so to utilize the restrooms. Less than 50 people came and went from this location with almost all of them wanting access to the restroom facilities. Only 4 people utilized the shelter the entire time Parks staff was on site, which was up to the event cancellation. Some sought shelter under the outdoor overhang

instead of entering the school which should not have been permitted. The advanced notice to the school system allowed the Director of Schools and PIO to prepare for possible inquiries. A school janitorial staff person arrived prior to closing the site and took responsibility for doing so. City and Pilgrimage staff will also be trained in how to access and utilize either the building or fire alarm PA systems.

Any evacuation plan, no matter how well thought out, requires execution by staff and cooperation by evacuees. It is to be expected that some people will ignore the evacuation order and attempt to remain on site which was the case at Pilgrimage. Some attendees seemed confused and didn't know where to go or didn't want to leave the property. This was especially true of those who sought shelter under the main beer tent. When possible, evacuations are ordered prior to a weather event occurring to allow sufficient time for evacuees to reach a safe location. The furthest designated parking area is an approximate 1.3-mile walk which is also consistent with where many attendees park. There was little evidence to suggest that Pilgrimage's security personnel appropriately worked to clear all areas of the site. In fact, many reports to City staff on site and/or to the 911 center indicated that security staff were providing false information and, in at the main beer tent, pushing and shoving individuals.

Just prior to the evacuation order being given, Command staff directed Parks and Risk employees to change radio channels in accordance with the established ICS205. This is designed to allow communications to occur between groups of people who are working the same objective, in this case, sheltering. However, the employees found the radio channel to be devoid of conversation. The only information being received was from the single Pilgrimage radio that Parks staff was in possession of at City Hall. It was noted that City cell phones didn't work well at this time with AT&T appearing to work somewhat better than Verizon.

Immediately after the morning briefing, City staff were assigned specific responsibilities and locations where they would report and assist anyone seeking shelter. At the time of the code yellow, staff were scattered throughout the site. Some staff waited for the group to assemble while others had already departed to their posts. This caused some initial confusion which can be avoided in the future.

The City staff assigned to Liberty Elementary arrived in about 15 minutes. Within approximately 10 minutes afterwards, A Franklin fire unit arrived to unlock the doors. The situation was calm the entire time the public was inside the building with no confrontations occurring. Law Enforcement was dispatched to the shelter on two separate occasions due to school alarms being activated. In the future, the school representative will make notification to the alarm company to disable the school alarm system prior to the shelter being opened.

City staff did a good job of dividing up into assigned groups when the time came to evacuate the park and head to designated shelter areas. Notification was sufficient to allow staff to get to City Hall in a timely manner and unlock the building, as well as the Old Courthouse basement, before any evacuees arrived at there. Parks staff had parked their golf carts at the entrance of the park in preparation for evacuation which allowed for an easier transition through the park on foot and then to City hall on the carts.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Parks staff has recommended a walkthrough of another severe weather evacuation and make sure all staff persons know which group/building they are being assigned before the festival. This would provide ample opportunity for all staff persons to become familiar with the buildings and exits prior to the event.*
- *Ensure an effective communications plan and equipment (i.e. P A System) are in place for all shelter areas.*
- *Due to the amount of rain, the Grand Champion Tent was an issue near the pond. Further damage was caused even days after the initial cancellation because of its location in the floodplain. For all future events, no tents will be permitted in the floodplain around the pond area.*
- *All VIP tents shall be located on the east side of the interurban due to the ingress and egress problems. Paddocks on the south side of the arena and west inside the paddock are ok to continue.*
- *The City should consider providing uniformed law enforcement officer support at each shelter location.*

## SITE EVACUATION PILGRIMAGE PLAN

The following is recognized by Pilgrimage:

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Messaging after the evacuation was practically non-existent. Pilgrimage has recognized the need to hire a Communications Director who is familiar with crisis communications to manage safety awareness before, during and after the festival for all contingencies and variables. This position will be filled prior to the next event.*
- *An effective communications system must be available at each shelter location to keep the population informed. Personnel should have access to and training on the system.*
- *Moving forward, Pilgrimage will be required to establish formal agreements with each shelter location and to provide proof of insurance coverage.*
- *It is recommended that the video safety message and shelter locations should be made available to attendees prior to the event (by e-mail or text and also available on the event's website). Shelter locations should also be made available on festival map handouts and on signage near all exits.*
- *Pilgrimage must provide sufficient representation at each designated shelter location that is equipped with sufficient communications equipment to receive and provide continuing updates.*
- *It is recommended that Pilgrimage provide signs or maps that show the location of pick up sites for Uber and Lyft.*
- *While there are ample opportunities for sheltering from lightning, there is not sufficient tornado shelters readily available in reasonable distances from the venue. When Williamson County has been placed under a "Tornado Watch", the event is to be suspended or cancelled.*
- *Soon after the evacuation was announced, headline artist arrived and requested an escort onto the property. This was denied by law enforcement command as incoming traffic had been stopped. Pilgrimage should ensure communications with artists during an evacuation so as not to unnecessarily burden staff with these types of requests.*

- *After the initial stage announcements to evacuate the site were made, sound technicians began to remove sound equipment to protect it from the weather. This eliminated the stages as a resource to make additional announcements. A readily available and tested backup means of communications must be available in these occurrences.*

## MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS

During the Pilgrimage Festival, as with most events held in the City, the City of Franklin Communications Team is responsible for communicating with our residents regarding aspects of the event, including traffic, as well as responding to any media requests that pertain directly to city operations during the festival. Once the code yellow was ordered on Saturday, the Communications Manager reported to Incident Command and remained there until being released by the Incident Commander late Saturday evening. She also returned on Sunday morning and remained there until Sunday evening. During the incident, Pilgrimage was the lead communications agency with the City's communications team offering support in getting out the messages as well as providing information to city officials.

The Communications Manager and Public Outreach Specialist along with the Franklin TV Supervisor and Police PIO worked to speak from one voice during this crisis response and to also work with Pilgrimage Organizers to have a timely unified message through all our social channels. The Communications Team was in the Incident Command at the Festival both Saturday and Sunday. Police PIO was working off-site.

The following is a total of posts on each social channel.

*Facebook:* 14 posts, reaching 41,998

*Twitter:* 26 posts, 608 engagements, (382 Likes, 175 retweets, 51 Replies) Inbound Messages by Sentiment: 10 Negative, 16 positive and 29 neutral

*Instagram:* 10 posts, 640 Likes, all positive comments

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Although pre-written messages for this type of emergency were delineated in the Pilgrimage Festival Ops plan, messages for this event were crafted on the fly.*
- *The Nixle safety alert option or other messaging platform should have been messaged to concert goers by Pilgrimage and also talked about prior to event with all Communications staff about how it would be used.*

## DISPATCH COMMUNICATIONS


Williamson County 911 scheduled four tactical incident dispatchers to work the event in four 8-hour periods (two per day) beginning at 0700 and ending at 2300. Team members worked from one laptop to monitor outside venue incidents as well as track on-site incidents using the event-provided CAD program. Team members worked off two portable radios to monitor the public safety channel, a third radio to communicate with ECOMM and a fourth radio to communicate with the Event Staff. Team members arrived in uniform, appropriately credentialed, and were given the opportunity to coordinate with other members of the Unified Command to understand and accomplish shared goals.

### After Action Recommendations

- The radio communications plan allowed for successful management of the event.
- Efforts should be made to engage all 911 communications staff in the planning process at least six weeks prior to the event.
- Coordination with EMS to determine how to track off-site incidents resulting in transport should be defined.
- Individual ear-piece for each tactical incident dispatcher monitoring portable radios to ensure proper radio channel monitoring.
- Clear expectations of roles between the 911 Center and the on-site 911 communications staff.
- Clear understanding of each component within the IAP (emergency plans, meeting times and locations, etc.)
- Receipt and review of the final IAP one week prior to the event, or at a weekly stakeholder meeting
- Provide laptops at each medic tent to document treat/release patient contacts to reduce radio traffic for incidents not requiring units to be dispatched or patients transported.

## MEDICAL

Medical needs were the responsibility of Williamson Medical Center Emergency Medical Services (EMS) with assistance as needed from the Franklin Fire Department. Three medical tents were positioned throughout the event. One main medical tent, consisting of eight treatment beds, was also on site, as well as two ambulances. Additionally, four Lifelight landing zones were established for the event; however, no incident occurred that required their usage. A total of 91 medical calls were answered during the event. Sixty-nine of these were treated at one of the three medical first aid tents, while three were transported to a hospital. The remainder were treated throughout the venue.



## WIFI

The festival organizers intended to provide WIFI access from three available networks.

- “Pilgrimage Command” – Connectivity for the Command Center
  - This connection allowed the Command center to function although not without some difficulty at times. On one occasion, the system began experiencing delays which required a restart
  - On Day 2, Unified Command prepared to utilize their own wireless network to avoid a reoccurrence.
- “Pilgrimage Production” – Connectivity for the Pilgrimage Production Staff



- This connection seemed to meet the needs of those using it.
- “Pilgrimage 2018” – Connectivity for site wide public internet access
  - This connection was viewed as non-existent and would not support effective communications during critical incidents.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *It is necessary that system restarts be coordinated with those it will affect.*
- *In the absence of sufficient WIFI for public safety usage, Pilgrimage must provide an acceptable means in which to communicate with attendees and staff throughout the event.*

## GIS

New this year was the incorporation of the City’s GIS support in the Command Post and the creation of a situational awareness dashboard (see Figure 1). Using this resource, GIS was able to track all medical and fire incidents, unit availability, on-site medical bed and ambulance availability, and weather. This dashboard was available for viewing to anyone with internet access. The original intent was to also have this information viewable in the main medical trailer and tent. Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient WIFI prevented this from happening.

A goal for this year’s event was to implement a GIS solution for tracking medical, fire and law incidents, as well as, medical and fire resource availability, and medical on-site bed availability. The necessity was spurred from events in prior years where the capability of tracking calls and resource availability on a micro scale could not be accomplished using traditional dispatch and CAD methods. The process, using ArcGIS Online and the Collector app, through the City’s enterprise agreement with ESRI, was hashed out over roughly a six-week period prior to the event. Being that this process was new and could not be replicated by another project of similar scope, a substantial amount of time was spent testing and hammering out details between GIS and Fire Department.

The primary goal of tracking calls and resource availability was mostly accomplished. When calls came in to be dispatched they were then entered into the web-based GIS and displayed on the corresponding dashboard that indicated the approximate location of call origination as well as any resources dispatched to the call.

One aspect of the GIS system that was intended to be used during the event was the ability to track the availability of beds at the main medical tent and ambulances. This capability was contingent on network availability at the main medical tent so that EMS could enter the changes as they occurred. However, this element of the data collection process was not possible due to the lack of network connectivity at the main medical tent. In an effort to resolve the issue, the GIS professional tasked with tracking incidents within the venue was tasked to the EMS trailer. This resulted in the inability to maintain the operational dashboard for a short period of time.

Communication between dispatch and GIS was effective, primarily due to the proximity of the two agencies and willingness of dispatch workers to keep GIS staff abreast of current happenings. The process of displaying call data as it came in and entered into GIS via the constructed dashboards was effective. Real time stats regarding total number of calls by hour and by call type as well as resource availability were displayed accurately and available when needed.

While GIS was thoroughly versed in the software solution, it was a challenge to keep up with the increase of call volume for someone who has no experience with dispatch process and has exercised the ability to manage numerous calls coming in at once.

*After Action Recommendations*

- *It is recommended that a trained dispatcher be taught the data entry process while having GIS support personnel available for technical assistance.*
- *Dedicated earpieces for each radio operator is necessary when operating inside the Command center.*




Figure 1 - Sample Data

## FIRE INSPECTIONS

### Pre-event Inspections

Approximately 20 hours of pre-event inspections were conducted from September 13 to September 21 for correcting of deficiencies while the site was under construction. The following items were noted:

- The flammable/combustible liquid aboveground storage tanks did not meet code. The tank vendor was required to remove the gasoline tank and add a vent to the diesel fuel tank.
- The tents were not properly installed.
- Inadequate water barrels used to anchor the tent on the polo field.
- Insufficient egress from the mess tent.
- Properly tagged fire extinguishers were installed throughout the site.
- The stages were staffed 24/7 to assess their condition and safety. The stage vendor had comprehensive emergency and action plans.
- It would have been advantageous to inspect the food tents prior to the start of the event, but due to weather conditions, many food vendors did not load-in until Saturday.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *The City will only permit the use of above ground storage tanks listed to UL Standard 2085 and will require Pilgrimage to provide documentation that the tank is listed.*
- *Tent vendors shall be required to provide installation instructions and staking diagrams for the larger tents. Instructions should include wind restrictions.*
- *The City will permit water barrels only if they are approved for tent use. The City may also require the use of concrete blocks to anchor tents when stakes are not an option.*
- *Pilgrimage shall submit drawings showing egress from each tent.*

#### Event Inspections

This year, fire inspectors were assigned to attend the event to conduct on-going inspections. Inspectors were on-site from 0600 hours Saturday until the event was cancelled. On Sunday, an inspector arrived on site at 0600 hours and remained on site until the event was cancelled. When the event was cancelled on Saturday, inspectors remained onsite to assist suppression crews. During the event inspections, the following items were noted.

- Food tent issues in the Golden Road Record area.
- U-Shaped food area by the Midnight Sun had one location where a truck and trailer combination blocked access to several food tents.
- Improperly secured propane tanks.
- Some users of solid-fuel cooking appliances did not have Class K or water fire extinguishers. Pilgrimage staff needs to ensure that that vendors are required to have these types of extinguishers.
- To hide the back of house areas from the festival guests, the Pilgrimage surrounds the food vending areas with fencing. Access to the area is made through gates, which may not be obvious in an emergency egress.
- One of the gates in the polo field was unable to fully open due to dirt built-up behind the gate.
- There was an incident where a fire occurred in the propane line where it connected to the appliance. The fire was quickly extinguished by the vendor.
- There was an incident where a tent pole fell causing minor injuries to a guest. It is unknown why the tent failed, but one possibility is that the vendor had used a wood plate under the pole to prevent the pole from sinking into the ground while he tensioned the fabric. It is unknown if the tent manufacturer approves this practice.
- While there was some trash accumulation, it did not seem excessive given the size and nature of the event. Vendors cooperated by breaking down their boxes and keeping them separate from the regular trash.
- Pilgrimage staff were very responsive to fire department requests, and in most cases complied quickly.

#### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Provide at least 25-foot separation between the tents and the fence. This will provide 10-feet for the Vendor's equipment and 15-feet for an access lane between the fence and the vendor equipment. A gate should also be provided in the fence near the food vendors to provide access from the road.*

- *Pilgrimage shall provide a drawing showing a detailed layout of vendor equipment.*
- *The Fire Department will require that access aisles perpendicular to the main access aisle be provided at every booth or every other booth.*
- *The Pilgrimage staff member assigned to each food area should be responsible for checking their area using an inspection list provided by the fire department.*
- *Clearly differentiate the gate from the rest of the fence.*
- *Parks staff should ensure the gates are open during the week before the event.*
- *Continue the practice of using the Sensit monitor to check gas connections.*
- *Tent vendors shall be required to provide installation instructions and staking diagrams for the larger tents. Instructions should include wind restrictions.*

## FIRE OPERATIONS

The Fire Department staffed the event with the same amount of personnel as 2017 with the addition of an on-site inspector during festival hours. In addition to our normal deployment, several tactical additions were implemented this year.

- A Basic Life Support bag, a trauma bag and an AED staged on 4 different 4x4 type vehicles to assist EMS if needed.
- Ballistic vests and helmets
- MultiRae Gas detection monitors
- The event was staffed with personnel qualified for HazMat, Swiftwater and Rope Operations in case those type of events arose.
- 2 Personal Floatation Devices (PFD) and a rope throw bag were placed near the Grand Champion tent since there was a demonstration near the water. Training was provided to the tent manager with instructions to brief her staff on the location and use of these items if they were needed, but not to delay a call for help should someone fall in the water.
- Hose, nozzles and appliances were pre-staged near two different hydrants to allow better fire protection in otherwise limited traffic areas.

Fire and EMS Departments both provided Golf Carts for service provision. There was some confusion early on about which agency's cart was being dispatched. The Operations Plan instructed personnel to transmit "Fire Cart" anytime a fire unit was being dispatched but this was not clearly understood by all.

The Fire Operations Section Chief (FOSC) was under the impression that an on-site dispatcher would dispatch all fire units. Instead, the FOSC was provided the information and had to assign fire units as needed. This was in accordance with the plans design but was misunderstood. The concern is that the process did not appear effective since during a "major" incident on site he would be in the command mode and lose the ability to manage other resources. This issue will be resolved during future discussions.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Having a certified fire inspector on-site during the event was extremely valuable. This process will continue for future events.*

## COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY ACCESS

We did receive information that some businesses and/or residents may have been denied the opportunity to leave or access the streets where their property was located during the event. Although we do not have specifics, it is believed that this occurred during the evacuation phase when all traffic was stopped on Franklin Rd and some on Liberty Pike in order to safely evacuate attendees to shelter.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Future planning efforts should ensure that reasonable access to property is a priority.*

## PERMITTED ATTENDANCE

As previously reported, the attendance cap was set at 27,500 each day, not counting children under 10. Ticket sales for the event were in the neighborhood of 25,000. The highest recorded attendance for Saturday was 22,103 at 4:30pm. As reported, everything was running smoothly until the evacuation occurred. This is attributed to the various adjustments that occurred as identified in our previous years after action report. Planning efforts and execution by both Pilgrimage and the City demonstrated that the site and road network could accommodate this size attendance. While evacuation proved to be a challenge, this report identifies many areas where the lack of planning, or the failure to properly execute the plan, were directly responsible for the outcome.

### *After Action Recommendations*

- *Successfully address all recommendations previously cited in this report.*
- *Ensure that planning efforts addresses a variety of contingencies for successful event management.*
- *Continue to participate in joint table top exercises to test plan elements.*

## POST GROUNDS REPAIRS

The dog park was re-opened on October 11<sup>th</sup> while the full park was re-opened October 26<sup>th</sup>. Appendix A includes post repair fees for the grounds of Harlinsdale Farm.

## CONCLUSION

While much planning is undertaken year after year, there is always room for improvement. The weather event that caused the evacuation and subsequent cancellation was unfortunate. And while the evacuation itself exposed many deficiencies, it provided an invaluable learning opportunity for everyone involved, including festival attendees. All who participate in Pilgrimage are committed to continual improvement of our plans and capabilities to ensure its success. In that spirit, and to provide a high degree of public safety, the City of Franklin will require Pilgrimage to provide, as requested, proof of meeting certain expectations prior to opening each day of the festival.

## APPENDIX A

Pilgrimage Repair Cost Harlinsdale Farm 2018						
Usage	Description	Comments	Usage	Units	Total Cost	Charge From
Extra Item	NSI	Viking Landscaping repair on irrigation repair from Pilgrimage	1		\$ 640.00	9/21/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Gary Bentley Trucking LLC-Pre-Pilgrimage Sand	1		\$ 1,188.18	9/28/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Grass seed for Pilgrimage Cleanup	1		\$ 508.00	10/2/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Purchased at True Valve - Plumbing Fitting	1		\$ 12.59	10/5/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Purchased at co-op - Straw	1		\$ 200.00	10/5/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Purchased at True ValueElectrical Supplies	1		\$ 39.75	10/18/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Purchased from Maury FenceReplacement of damage fence at TPHF	1		\$ 3,500.00	10/18/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Maury Fence CompanyFence Repair	1		\$ 3,810.00	10/18/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	George Bentley Trucking LLC - 135 tons of Pug-2	1		\$ 1,937.97	10/24/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Reed Landscaping did the work Repairs to Turf & Irrigation	1		\$ 48,808.00	10/30/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Purchased at Co-Op - Grass Seed & Fertilizer	1		\$ 397.00	10/30/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Jarrett Paving, LLC - Grading and spreading gravel	1		\$ 11,400.00	10/31/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	George Bentley Trucking LLC - 22 tons Crusher Run-2	1		\$ 316.42	10/31/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	George Bentley LLC - 22.5 tons of gravel	1		\$ 322.88	11/2/2018 0:00
Extra Item	NSI	Mid-Tn cleaned S. parking lot asphalt	1		\$ 1,750.00	11/7/2018 0:00
					<b>Total Extra Item</b>	<b>\$ 74,830.79</b>
Labor	STRAIGHT	Inventory Specialist worked 1 hour on set-up barricades	1	Hours	\$ 20.86	10/9/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Crew Chief worked 2 hours pressure washing	2	Hours	\$ 41.62	10/24/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Crew Chief worked 3 hours pressure washing	3	Hours	\$ 62.43	10/25/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Crew Chief worked 3 hours moving barricades, clean open TPHF	3	Hours	\$ 62.43	10/26/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 1 hour on set-up barricades	1	Hours	\$ 15.80	10/9/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker work 1 hour on set-up barricades	1	Hours	\$ 14.62	10/9/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 pressure washing mud off fences	3	Hours	\$ 47.07	10/3/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 2 hours pressure washing in front of Concession	2	Hours	\$ 31.38	10/24/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing in front of Concession	3	Hours	\$ 47.07	10/25/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours moving barricades, cleaning openTPHF	3	Hours	\$ 47.07	10/26/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 2 hours pressure washing around Concession	2	Hours	\$ 32.88	10/24/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing mud off fences	3	Hours	\$ 47.40	10/3/2018 0:00



Usage	Description	Comments	Usage	Units	Total Cost	Charge From
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing mud off fences	3	Hours	\$ 47.40	10/4/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing mud off fences	3	Hours	\$ 47.40	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 2 hours pressure washing around Concession	2	Hours	\$ 31.60	10/24/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing mud of fences	3	Hours	\$ 43.86	10/4/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 3 hours pressure washing mud of fences	3	Hours	\$ 43.86	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Facilities Worker worked 2 hours moving barricades, cleaning, open TPHF	2	Hours	\$ 29.24	10/26/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Grounds Crew Chief worked 2.25 Mowing by request	2.25	Hours	\$ 46.80	9/17/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Grounds Crew Chief worked 1.25 hours Mowing by request	1.5	Hours	\$ 31.20	9/21/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Grounds Crew Chief worked 1.5 hours Section 1 & 2 repairs	1.5	Hours	\$ 31.20	10/1/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 1 hour for Sand Delivery	7	Hours	\$ 184.38	9/13/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 2.5 hours Mowing by request	2.25	Hours	\$ 59.27	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 7.25 Mowing of Park	7.25	Hours	\$ 190.97	9/20/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 7 hours section 1 & 2 repairs	7	Hours	\$ 184.38	10/1/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 4.5 hours section 2 repairs	4.5	Hours	\$ 118.53	10/2/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 4.5 hours spreading Straw	4.5	Hours	\$ 118.53	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Foreman worked 6 hours repair event lawn	6	Hours	\$ 158.04	10/22/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 7 hours Dog Park & South Parking	7	Hours	\$ 122.71	10/1/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 4.5 hours grading Dog Park	4.5	Hours	\$ 78.89	10/2/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 4.5 hours spreading straw Event space	4.5	Hours	\$ 78.89	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 6 hours spreading sand Event space	6	Hours	\$ 105.18	10/22/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 7 hours finish grading South Parking	7	Hours	\$ 111.30	10/1/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 4.5 hours grading North Paddock	4.5	Hours	\$ 71.55	10/2/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 4.5 hours grading North dog park	4.5	Hours	\$ 71.55	10/5/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Landscape Worker worked 6 spreading sand over Event space	6	Hours	\$ 95.40	10/22/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Crew Chief worked 6.5 hours Fence Removal	6.5	Hours	\$ 146.97	9/18/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 5 hours Fence Removal	5	Hours	\$ 113.05	9/19/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 8.75 hours Fence Removal	8.75	Hours	\$ 197.84	9/20/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 5 hours Fence Removal	5	Hours	\$ 113.05	9/21/2018 0:00
Labor	OVERTIME	Maintenance Worker worked 13.5 hours Fence Removal	13.5	Hours	\$ 686.68	9/22/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 2 hours Fence Removal	2	Hours	\$ 45.22	10/2/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Crew Chief worked 4 hours spreading gravel	4	Hours	\$ 90.44	10/23/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Crew Chief worked 2 hours spreading gravel	2	Hours	\$ 45.22	10/24/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Crew Chief worked 2.5 hours spreading gravel	2.5	Hours	\$ 56.53	10/25/2018 0:00

Usage	Description	Comments	Usage	Units	Total Cost	Charge From
Labor	STRAIGHT	maintenance crew chief worked 2.5 hours at North End Rd	2.5	Hours	\$ 56.53	11/16/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 3.5 hours Fence Removal	3.5	Hours	\$ 80.08	9/18/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 2 hours Fence Removal	2	Hours	\$ 45.76	9/19/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 5.25 hours prep	5.25	Hours	\$ 120.12	9/19/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 4 hours Prep	4	Hours	\$ 91.52	9/21/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 3.5 hours spreading gravel	3.5	Hours	\$ 80.08	10/30/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 6 hours Fence removal	6	Hours	\$ 123.96	9/18/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 6 hours Fence removal	6	Hours	\$ 123.96	9/19/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 5.25 Prep	5.25	Hours	\$ 108.47	9/20/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 4 hours Prep	4	Hours	\$ 82.64	9/21/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 6 hours Fence Removal	6	Hours	\$ 120.42	9/18/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 6 hours Fence Removal	6	Hours	\$ 120.42	9/19/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 6 hours Prep	5.25	Hours	\$ 105.37	9/20/2018 0:00
Labor	STRAIGHT	Maintenance Worker worked 4 hours Prep	4	Hours	\$ 80.28	9/21/2018 0:00
			<b>Total Labor</b>		<b>\$ 5,407.32</b>	
			<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>\$ 80,238.11</b>	